THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INVASION OF THE TORT OF
INVASION OF PRIVACY
Harvey L. Zuckman*

I.

INTRODUCTION**

The tort of invasion of privacy has had a short
but tortuous development made even more tortuous by a number of recent rulings by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. This
common law tort does not begin with the normal
judicial iterations that created and sculpted other
torts.' Rather, it began life as a law review article
2
prompted by personal pique.
One of the co-authors of the law review article
was Samuel D. Warren, a socially prominent Boston lawyer who felt that he was being unfairly
hounded by the news media. The final straw for
Warren was the press' encampment around his
home during a party for his daughter. When he
returned to his law office still fuming over the incident, he is alleged to have said to his law partner
Louis D. Brandeis, who would later become ajustice of the United States Supreme Court, that
there must be some basis in the law to protect
himself and his family from such intrusiveness by
the press. 3 Out of Warren's pique and Brandeis'
sympathy for his partner's plight came the famous
article that gave birth to the tort of invasion of privacy.
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In the article published in the Harvard Law Review, the two men argued that historically, the
common law protected personal privacy. But their
central authority for this proposition is doubtful
at best. The case they relied on was PrinceAlbert v.
Strange.4 There, Queen Victoria's consort brought
an action to enjoin not only the reproduction of
etchings made by the royal couple for their own
pleasure but also the publication of a summary
description of the works. The court went beyond
established common law protection of intellectual
property because a mere summary description or
simple listing of the etchings would hardly have
5
qualified as an invasion of any property interest.
Vice-Chancellor Knight Bruce said that the courts
in proper cases would prevent injurious disclosures as to private matters.6
It does not appear to have occurred to Warren
and Brandeis that Prince Albert v. Strange may just
have been a sui generis hometown decision favoring the nominal ruler of the court handing down
the decision. Up until recently, the English courts
have not recognized an independent right of pri7
vacy as to all the mere subjects of the realm.
Given its dubious birthright, it was little wonder
that the first court to consider the claim of com4 2 De Gex & Sm 652, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (V.C. 1848), on
appeal I McN. & G. 25, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849).
5
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mon law protection for privacy rejected it." However, over the next seventy years, most American
courts accepted the idea of such protection of privacy in a number of disparate situations, but without much rhyme or reason. 9
To bring order out of the chaos that Warren
and Brandeis had wrought, the late Dean Prosser
wrote a seminal law review article identifying four
distinct branches of the tort.l" According to Prosser, they are: intrusion into another's seclusion;
unreasonable publicity of private embarrassing
facts; casting another in a false light; and appropriation of another's name, image or personality
for personal benefit.'I
But even Prosser did not fully regularize these
torts that have become known collectively as invasion of privacy, and he even added to the tortuousness of their development. First, he tried to
justify the existence of the "rather nebulous" tort
of "false light"'12 by arguing that the interest protected was that of reputation, having the same
overtones of mental distress as in defamation.'"
With all due deference to Dean Prosser, a privacy
tort protecting the interest in reputation is anomalous. Concern for reputation presupposes interaction between the person attacked and those
who perceive the victim's standing in the community. Such interaction is antithetical to the idea of
being let alone by society, an idea central to the
concept of personal privacy. 14
Second, Prosser did not fully foresee that if
there is a dignitary tort protecting against appropriation of one's name, image or personality, it
necessarily spawns yet another full-blown tort protecting the proprietary interest in publicity of celebrities.' 5 If a celebrity's name, image and persona are protected from exploitation by others
without permission, the celebrity's identity takes
8
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PROSSER AND KEETON ON THIE LAW OF TORTS 863 (W.
Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
13 Prosser, supra note 10 at 400.
14
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Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 326, 340-41 (1966); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right
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on economic value that he or she may exploit or
not. Thus, the appropriation branch of the privacy tort itself has two branches, protection
against appropriation of identity and protection
of the value of celebrity. " But Prosser's errors and
oversights regarding the structure and parameters
of this complex tort pale in comparison to the
twisting of it by federal appeals judges sitting on
the other side of San Francisco Bay.

II.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE RIGHT
OF PUBLICITY

A.

The Vanna White Case

The tortuous treatment of the right of publicity
at the hands of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit begins with the distress of
the well-known syndicated game show personality
Vanna White over a series of advertisements prepared by an agency for Samsung Electronics
America, Inc. to promote its cutting edge electronic products. Each of the advertisements in the
series depicted a current example of popular culture and linked it to a particular Samsung product. The ads were all set in the twenty-first century
(then more than a decade in the future) and conveyed the message that the Samsung product featured would still be in use at that time. By suggesting outrageous future developments for the
cultural items employed, including the replacement of game show hosts by robots, the ads were
supposed to create a humorous response from
readers. One reader, Vanna White, was not
amused.
The advertisement that prompted Ms. White to
sue Samsung and its ad agency was for Samsung
VCRs. The ad depicted a robot, dressed in a wig,
Speak fiom Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel
and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 963-64 (1968);

Ruth F. Walden and Emile Netzhammer, False Right Invasion
of Privacy: Untanglingthe Web nf Uncertainty, 9 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENTI. L.J. 347, 348-49 (1987) (commenting on the weakness
in Prosser's position).
15
See Haelan Laboratories, Inc., v. Topps Chewing Gum,
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert.
I 6 The dichotomous nature of appropriation was judicially recognized for the first time when the Second Circuit
held in Haelanthat in addition to a baseball player's right not
to have his dignity injured by the unauthorized commercial
use of his photograph, he also "has a right in the publicity
value of his photograph" which right has pecuniary worth.
Id. at 868.
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gown and jewelry, which the agency deliberately
chose to resemble Ms. White's blond hair and her
style of dress. The robot was juxtaposed next to a
television game show set strongly resembling the
"Wheel of Fortune" set on which Ms. White
worked. The ad caption read "Longest-running
game show 2012 A.D." Officers and managers of
the two corporate defendants referred to the advertisement as the "Vanna White" ad, though Ms.
White neither consented to being involved nor received compensation in any way.
Following circulation of the ad in numerous periodicals, Ms. White brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Central District of
California, inter alia, for violation of her right of
publicity. The trial judge granted summary judgment for the defendants on all of her claims. On
the common law right of publicity claims, the
court held that Ms. White's claim failed to satisfy
California's requirement that defendants must appropriate her "name or likeness" for commercial
purposes or otherwise if there is to be a violation
of her right of publicity, citing Eastwood v. Superior
Court.17

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the
robot advertisement did not make use of Ms.
White's name or likeness but added that "the
common law right of publicity is not so confined,"1 8 and reversed the trial court's summary
judgment on this cause of action. Interpreting
Eastwood, the appeals court rejected the idea that
California law required a right of publicity cause
of action be pleaded only by alleging an appropriation of name or likeness. The Eastwood case did
involve an unauthorized use of both photographs
of the actor Clint Eastwood and his name, but the
Ninth Circuit said that did not mean the California court had limited right of publicity actions to
those particular kinds of takings alone.' 9
17
198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (1983). Eastwood held that a
right of publicity violation may be pleaded by alleging "(1)
the defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiffs name or likeness to the defendant's advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and

(4) resulting injury." Id.
18 White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d

1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992), ced. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993).
Compare Wendt v. Host int'l. Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir.
1997), rehearing denied, 197 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 1999), cell.
denied sub nom. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Wendt, 531 US.
811 (2000) (animated models of plaintiffs' characters in the
television sitcom "Cheers" placed in a chain of airport bars;
plaintiffs prevailed).
19

Id.

The Ninth Circuit supported its proposition
that the right of publicity of celebrities could be
invaded by means other than the taking of their
names and images by citing Prosser's California
Law Review article, which barely mentions the
right. 2' It quoted his statement regarding the related tort of appropriation that "[i] t is not impossible that there might be appropriation of the
plaintiffs identity, as by impersonation, without
the use of either his name or his likeness." 2' The
appeals court then went on to cite three examples
of the violation of a celebrity's right of publicity
where the violation did not involve the taking of
the celebrity's name or image. They were the successful actions by singer-actress Bette Midler for
the taking of her vocal sound by a sound-alike
singer,2 2 a famous race car driver for the taking of
a photograph of his distinctive car though he
could not be identified as the driver in the picture23 and Johnny Carson for the taking of his signature "Tonight Show" introduction, "Here's
Johnny."24 According to the court,
These cases teach not only that the common law right
of publicity reaches means of appropriation other than
name or likeness, but that the specific means of appropriation are relevant only for determining whether the
defendant has in fact appropriated the plaintiff's identity ...Although the defendants in these cases [Midler,
Motschenbacher and Carson] avoided the most obvious
means of appropriating the plaintiffs' identities, each
of their actions directly implicated the commercial interests5 which the right of publicity is designed to protect.

The Ninth Circuit gave a ringing endorsement
of the right of publicity in White. "Television and
other media create marketable celebrity identity
value . .

.

.The law protects the celebrity's sole

right to exploit this value whether the celebrity
has achieved her fame out of rare ability, dumb
luck, or a combination thereof."2 1, But while no
one that I am aware of disagrees with the value of
2(
Prosser, supra note 10, at 406-07 (citing Haelan, 202
F.2d 866, "[O]nce it is protected by the law ... the plaintiff

can capitalize by selling licenses .. . [which have] what has

been called a 'right of publicity.'").
21
Id. at 401 n.155.
22
See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.
1988). Compare Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied 503 U.S. 951 (1993) (singing a soundalike song not in Mr. Wait's repertoire).
2"
See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498
F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
24
See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698
F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
25
White, 971 F.2d at 1398.
26
Id. at 1399.
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having such right, the Ninth Circuit panel majority's application of this branch of the tort in While
appears to extend the right beyond all reasonable
boundaries and has been severely criticized both
by other Ninth Circuit judges2 7 and legal commentators.2 8 The criticism appears to fall into
three distinct but related categories.
The first category is the court's misunderstanding of past precedent. As noted above, the panel
relied on Midler, Motschenbacher and Carson to jus-

tify extending the right of publicity beyond the
appropriation of celebrity names and true photographic images in order to cover a tongue-incheek robot designed and clothed to remind the
audience of Vanna White. But in these cases the
appropriators used certain positive indicia of the
celebrities involved to suggest that they freely associated themselves with and endorsed the appropriator's product. 2' But no such suggestion was
made by the advertiser when it used a robot reminiscent of a particular celebrity simply to make a
point about its product - to indicate, rather playfully, that while humans may be replaced as game
show stars by non-humans in the second decade
of the twenty-first century, its product will still be
in style. To hold that such a reference violated
Vanna White's right of publicity expands such
right beyond all reason."
The expansion of the right of publicity leads directly to the second category of criticisms - the
27 See id. at 1402 (Alarcon, J., dissenting); opinion of
KozinskiJ. dissenting from the order of the Ninth Circuit rejecting the suggestion of rehearing en banc in White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.
1993).
28
See, e.g., David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, NailingJell0 to a Wall: The Vanna White Case and the Limits of Celebrity
Rights, 3J. INrELL. PROP. . 67 (1995) (perhaps the most insightful criticism of the decision); Arlen W. Langvardt, The
Troubling Implications (# a Right of Publicity "Wheel" Spun Out of
Control, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 329 (1997) (an encyclopedic treatment of the right of publicity seen through the prism of the
White case); Linda j. Stack, White v. Samsung Electronics
America, Inc. 's Expansion of the Right of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free Speech, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1189
(1995) (a perceptive discussion of Whites harmful impact on
First Amendment protection);.John R. Braatz, White v. Samsung Electronics America: The Ninth Circuit Turns a New Letter in
California Right of Publicity Law, 15 PACE L. REV. 161 (1994);
Gretchen A. Pemberton, The Parodist'sClaim to Fame: A Parody
Exception to the Right of Publicity, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 97
(1993);John F. Hyland & Ted C. Lindquist Ill, Torts: White v.
Samsung Electronics America, Inc.: The Wheels of Justice Take an
Unfortunate Turn, 23 GOLDE.N GArE U. L. REV. 299 (1993). See
also William M. Borchard, The Common Law Right of Publicity is
Going Wrong in the United States': Waits v. Frito-Lay and White v.
Samsung Electronics, 3 ENT. L. REv. 208 (1992) (criticism of
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damage to First Amendment interests. What we
have in White is an attempt by the advertiser to
parody the robotic quality of Ms. White's job, i.e.,
revealing the previously concealed letters on a
game board. But parody and mockery are valuable commodities in a society that values free expression, both for their entertainment value"'
and, as Judge Kozinski noted in his dissent to the
rejection of an en banc rehearing of the appeal in
32
White, for their safety valve function.
By extending the protection of the right of publicity to a celebrity because a robot in an advertisement causes the audience to think of that celebrity removes from the public's intellectual domain
the opportunity to mock or parody those in the
public eye. That opportunity is so valuable that it
is considered to be an essential component of free
speech and, as such, protected by the First
Amendment.-" But a majority of the Ninth Circuit
panel cavalierly dismissed the parody defense on
the ground that it didn't apply to "true advertisement[s]." 3 4 The majority elaborated by saying

"Defendants' parody arguments are better addressed to non-commercial parodies. The difference between a 'parody' and a 'knock-off is the
difference between fun and profit."3 This facile
dismissal of the reach of the First Amendment ignores the well-established proposition that commercial speech has substantial constitutional protection" ! and stimulates the third category of critiNinth Circuit's right of publicity decisions from abroad).
29
See Welkowitz, supra note 28, at 77-79.
"I" As Professor Welkowitz frames it, "[w] hen the advertisement seeks to associate the positive values of the celebrity
with the product, a use of the commercial value may be occurring. But where the celebrity is merely a point of reference, the celebrity's commercial value is not being used." Id.
at 79-80. See Cher v. Forum Int'l. Ltd. 692 F.2d 634, 639 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983) (falsely implied
endorsement of products).
I
See, e.g., Gretchen A. Pemberton, The Product's Claim to
F'ame: A Parody Exception to the Right of Publicity, 27 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 97, 140 (1993) ("Parodies of celebrities are not just
something that should be permitted. They should be encouraged, and parodists should be rewarded. We need the
commentary. We need the laughter.").
21
White, 989 F.2d at 1516-17.
.
See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51-52
(1988) (parody of a liquor ad campaign on celebrity "first
times" they tried Compari featuring the Reverend Jerry
Falwell engaging in an incestuous act in an outhouse).
'14
White, 971 F.2d at 1401.
3
Id.
31
See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
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cism.
That category involves the failure of the panel
to perform the Supreme Court's mandated analysis to determine whether the particular limitation
on commercial speech meets constitutional muster. The Supreme Court's requirements justifying
limitation or suppression of commercial speech
are set down in CentralHudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Service Comm'n 3 7 The four-part ad hoc balancing test includes determining (1) whether the
expression to be limited promotes legal products,
services or activities and is truthful and not misleading;38 (2) whether the government has a substantial interest in prohibiting or limiting the
commercial speech; 1-71(3) whether the restriction
on expression directly advances the state interest
involved; 4 1 and (4) whether the restriction is only

Further critical analysis of White could be indulged in, but the main failing of White is that it
provides too much protection for the pecuniary
interests of celebrities in derogation of First
Amendment interests and the decision becomes
ludicrous when compared with the next case to be
discussed, Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.45 in
which too little protection is accorded by the appeals court to a celebrity of far greater magnitude
than Vanna White. In comparing the two cases,
one is tempted to suggest the analogy of a baseball umpire who blows a call and then attempts to
make amends to the team disadvantaged by shading another call, this time in favor of the previously disadvantaged team.
But two wrong calls don't make a right (of publicity).

as broad as necessary to advance the state's interest.

41

Since the purpose of this essay is not to plow
the same ground worked by earlier critics of the
White decision (and they are legion) but rather to
demonstrate that in the context of a later Ninth
Circuit decision 42 that White is quite indefensible,
I will not indulge in a detailed application of the
four-part CentralHudson test, 43 but rather will con-

fine myself to two observations concerning the
commercial speech doctrine. First, I submit the
governmental interest in extending the right of
publicity to include mere evocation of a celebrity's existence through parody or otherwise is
very thin and, in order to advance this interest, to
suppress a whole category of commercial speech,
i.e., parody of celebrities in advertising, is much
too extreme to be constitutionally justified. Second, regardless of how one might apply the fourpart test, the fact that the panel neglected even to
make an effort at application, severely undermines any claim the decision might have to being
in harmony with the First Amendment. It is simply
not good enough to say, "Defendants' parody arguments are better addressed to non-commercial
44
parodies."
Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); see also Langvardt, supra note 28, at
413, 432; Stack, supra note 28, at 1209-22.
37 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
38 Id. at 564, 566.
9
40
41

Id. at 564.
Id.
Id. at 565.

Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180
(9th Cir. 2001).
42

B.

The Dustin Hoffman Case

Straight male celebrities sometimes appear in
front of the public wearing female attire, usually
for some good dramatic reason and, of course,
voluntarily. For instance, Jack Lemmon and Tony
Curtis as members of an all-female band in the
classic Billy Wilder comedy "Some Like It Hot" or
Dustin Hoffman as a female soap opera actress in
another classic comedy "Tootsie." Needless to say,
no one forced these actors to appear "in drag."
But that was not the case when Mr. Hoffman's
face appeared in a photographic spread on current fashion in Los Angeles Magazine ("LAM" or
"the magazine").
In Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,46 the magazine, to "rev up" its media profile, 47 published an
article entitled "Grand Illusions" with accompanying computer doctored photographs making it
appear that famous Hollywood actors and actresses, mostly deceased, were wearing Spring
1997 fashions. One of the photographs was a publicist shot of Dustin Hoffman as "Tootsie" in a red
long-sleeved sequined evening dress and high
heels, posing in front of a large American flag.
43

Welkowitz, supra note 28 at 437-38; Stack, supra note

28, at 1209-18; Joshua Waller, The Right of Publicity: Preventing
the Exploitation of a Celebrity's Identity or Promoting the Exploitation of the First Amendment?, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 59, 83-84

(2001).
44
45

46
47

White, 971 F.2d at 1401.
255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id.
Id. at 1186.
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They still carried the text, "What do you get when
you cross a hopelessly straight, starving actor with
a dynamite red sequined dress? You get
' 48
America's hottest new actress."
In its March 1997 issue, LAM, then owned by
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. and now owned by the
Walt Disney Company, published the still but had
it altered, replacing Hoffman's body (but retaining his face) and replacing the long-sleeved red
sequined dress and pumps with a spaghettistrapped, cream-colored, silk evening dress and
high-heeled sandals. LAM also omitted the original caption accompanying the "Tootsie" still. The
text accompanying the computer altered image
read, "Dustin Hoffman isn't a drag in a buttercolored silk gown by Richard Tyler and Ralph
Lauren heels."' 4 9 LAM did not ask permission of
Hoffman to publish the altered photograph depicting his face or of Columbia Pictures Corpora51
tion, the original still's copyright owner. 1
Like Vanna White, Hoffman was not amused
and brought suit in state court, from which it was
removed to the United States District Court for
the Central District of California. Hoffman
claimed, inter alia, that the unauthorized use of
his image in the magazine as part of a contrived
female fashion spread violated his California right
of publicity. 5 1 After a bench trial, the district court
ruled for the screen actor on all of his claims and
awarded him $1,500,000 in compensatory dam5
ages and $1,500,000 in punitive damages.
On appeal, LAM argued that its use of the
"Tootsie" still was protected by the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit agreed with this contention and reversed the judgment of the district
court leaving Hoffman and his counsel empty
handed. The appeal court's theory was that com48

Id. at 1182-83.

49

Id. at 1183.

50

Id.

51

[d.

52
5_

I.
Id. at 1184 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983)).
54
Id. at 1184-85.
55
Id. at 1185. The cases referred to by the court were
Newcombe v. Adolph Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir.
1998) (use of a pitcher's image in a beer ad); Abdul-labbar v.
General Motors Corp. 85 F.3d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1996) (use
of a basketball player's former name in a television automobile commercial); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093,
1097-98 (9th Cir. 1992) (use of a sound-alike in a commercial); White v. Samsung Electronics of America, Inc., 971
F.2d 1395. 1396 (9th Cir. 1992): Midler v. Ford Motor Co..
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mercial speech, which has lesser First Amendment protection, is very narrow in scope having as
its core speech that "does no more than propose a
commercial transaction." 5:" And since the appropriation of Hoffman's visage was for an editorial
feature and not an advertisement or commercial
(as in White), the full force of the First Amendment applies to protect this use, no matter that
some of the manufacturers and sellers of the fashions featured in the spread also advertised in the
magazine, and the magazine provided a handy
buyers guide listing where the particular evening
gown and shoes purportedly worn by Hoffman
could be purchased. 54 As the court said, "These
facts are not enough to make the 'Tootsie' photograph pure commercial speech. If the altered
photograph had appeared in a Ralph Lauren advertisement, then we would be facing a case much
like those cited above [proposing commercial
transactions and clearly commercial speech] ."55
Thus, for the Ninth Circuit, the touchstone for
protection of a celebrity within its jurisdiction including Hollywood, is whether the celebrity's
name, image, look-alike, sound-alike or robotalike is appropriated for an ad or broadcast commercial proposing a commercial transaction.
That, of course, is the core of commercial speech.
No other appropriation, even one just a step removed from the core, as in Hoffman, will be considered actionable as a form of invasion of privacy
because it receives the full protection of the First
56
Amendment.
I submit the Ninth Circuit panel takes too
crabbed a view of the boundaries of commercial
speech and too broad a view of what the First
Amendment protects. First, the United States Supreme Court has taken a broader view of commer849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988) (use of a sound-alike of the
famous singer Bette Midler singing a Midler song in a commercial).
56 The court did suggest that when the right of privacy is
trumped by the First Amendment, the celebrity might make
out a case of knowingly false speech if he or she can establish
by clear and convincing evidence that the false expression
was made with actual malice under the doctrine of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Hoffman, 255 F.3d
at 1186-88. Unfortunately for Dustin Hoffman, the court did
not think the actor had made out such a case, but then he
and his counsel apparently did not think they were playing
the "actual malice" game since they never asserted an action
for defamation. Id. at 1183. 1 will not belabor this aspect of
the court's ruling because my interest here is only the right
of publicity privacy claim.
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cial speech. In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 5 7 the Discovery Network placed a number of magazine racks on public property with the
city's permission containing free magazines
describing the Network's many adult educational,
recreational and social programs. 58 Within a year
the city revoked permission and ordered the news
racks removed. 59 The Network fought the removal order and won in every federal court up to,
and including the United States Supreme Court.61 '
The High Court concluded (among other things)
that the controversy over the placement of the
racks to distribute the promotional literature involved commercial speech, quoting approvingly
and at length from Justice Blackmun's opinion in
perhaps the Court's strongest commercial speech
6
decision. 1
In Discovery Network, the placement of the magazine racks that was at issue, and that issue was at
least one step removed from the Network "proposing a commercial transaction." 6 2 In Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Products Corp.,63 the Court also dealt
with material outside the core. There the Court
considered, among other things, two mailings of
informational pamphlets which discussed human
sexuality and venereal disease but also made mention of contraceptive products, products pro6 4
duced by Youngs Drug Products Corporation.
Despite the fact that the pamphlets had contained
discussion of major public issues and thus outside
the core, the Court held that the expression in65
volved was commercial speech.
Also important to the determination of the
boundaries of commercial speech is the decision
of the California appeals court in Keimer v. Buena
Vista Books, Inc.66 The District Court of Appeals
for the First District held that a complaint alleging

false statements made on book and videotape covers reiterating verifiably false factual statements
contained in the books and videotapes themselves, amounted to commercial speech and, accepting the allegations of the complaint as true in
testing for its sufficiency, the falsity of the statements would strip this commercial speech of any
First Amendment protection.6 7 In Keimer, the infamous "Beardstown Ladies" investment group
claimed (falsely as it turned out) in numerous
books and a videotape produced by Disney owned
companies that it had "23.4% annual return" on
its investments. 68 Displayed prominently on the

front and back covers and the packaging of these
materials there often appeared statements such as
"23.4% ANNUAL RETURN" and "learn how to
outperform mutual funds and professional money
managers 3 to 1."69
While obviously intended to attract buyers, the
statements taken from the text did not directly
propose a commercial transaction and indeed,
might also have attracted readers in free public
lending libraries. Nevertheless, the California
court held the cover blurbs were commercial
speech.7° And, accepting the allegations of their

falsity for purposes of the appeal from the grant
of the demurrer below, the court further held
that the limited protection of such speech was determined by Central Hudson Gas & Elec.Corp. v.
Public Service Comm'n.7 ' According to the appeals

court, this commercial speech did not even meet
the threshold requirement of CentralHudson, i.e.,

that it not be false or misleading. 72 Therefore, if
the plaintiff were to establish the falsity of the
book and video cover statements at trial, he could
obtain an injunction and disgorgement of profits
73
under California's Unfair Trade Practices Act.

60

507 U.S. 410 (1993).
Id. at 412.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 414-15.

61

Id. at 420-21 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,

89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781 (2000), rev. denied, 2000 Cal. LX
1740 (2000); contra Lacoff v. Buena Vista Pub., Inc., 183 Misc.

425 U.S. at 761-62).
62
It is, of course, true that the Supreme Court held that
the placement of the racks tinder the circumstances of the
case was protected by the First Amendment. However, if
those circumstances had been less favorable as, for instance,
the racks seriously compromised public safety because placed
on sidewalks too close to fire hydrants, the First Amendment
would not protect the racks. But that would not have
changed the nature of the Network's means of expression as
commercial speech. In other words some commercial
speech is protected and some is not. See Central Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).

2d 600, 705 N.Y.S.2d 183 (2000) (N.Y. Sup. Ct.). But then as
my venerable wills instructor Thomas Atkinson once said to
my class, "You can find anything in the New York Miscellaneous Reports."
67
Keimer, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 790.
68 Id. at 782.
69
Id. at 783.
70
Id. at 788.
71
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
72
Keimer, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788. See CentralHudson, 447
U.S. at 564, 566 (1980).
73 Bus. & PROF. CODE §§17200, 17500 (West 1997).

57
58
59

63 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
64

Id.

65

Id.

66
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In Hoffman, the Ninth Circuit was confronted
with a similar kind of non-core commercial
speech but did not recognize it. While the "Grand
Illusions" piece in LAM did not directly propose a
commercial transaction, the piece was supportive
of at least one advertiser who was proposing commercial transactions in its pages and the magazine
conveniently provided a "Shopper's Guide" in the
back of the magazine.7 4 This reflects that the material is non-core commercial speech given a
lesser degree of First Amendment protection
under CentralHudson. And at least with regard to
the living celebrities depicted, this non-core commercial speech is demonstrably false. That the
readers might know that the Hoffman / 'Tootsie"
photograph had been altered because the magazine printed a small copy of the unaltered "Tootsie" still is beside the point.75 The doctored image

of Dustin Hoffman included in the spread necessarily gives the impression to the reader that the
actor voluntarily associated himself with this publishing charade. Nothing could be further from
the truth. Under Central Hudson, the use of Hoffman's face here has no First Amendment protection, therefore it is misleading and has no substantial public purpose. The Ninth Circuit was
wrong once again in a right of publicity case, this
time in preventing the celebrity from recovering
damages for the demeaning use of his doctored
image without permission.
The real gravamen of the Ninth Circuit's decision is not that Dustin Hoffman will have a few
million dollars less in his bank account but rather
the stripping of control from celebrities of their
names and images; they can now be exploited by
media types out to create a "buzz" for their enterprises in a manner other than traditional advertising. Given that there are more celebrities worth
exploiting within the confines of the Ninth Circuit than within any other federal circuit, this er74
75
76

HofJman, 255 F.3d at 1185.
Id. at 1187.
One commentator begs to differ as to the correctness

of the Hoffman case. See Landis C. Best, Ninth Circuit Limits
Right of Publicity Claims, 19 COMM. LAWYER I (Fall 2001).
While agreeing that the right of publicity has had a tortuous
existence, Best believes that it is akin to copyright protection
which has more First Amendment protections built in for
those who copying others' intellectual work and that it is a
welcome development that the Ninth Circuit has broadened
First Amendment protection in right of publicity cases.
First Amendment principles ... provide the tort with the
necessary breathing space to allow comment, criticism
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roneous decision will have far greater impact on
the celebrity population than would a similar decision from the Tenth Circuit. 7 3 It will also almost

surely have a greater impact on other courts because of the belief that the Ninth Circuit judges
must know what they are doing in right of publicity cases because they have so many of them. After all, practice makes perfect. Or does it?
Apparently not, for in Downing v. Abercrombie &
Fitch,77 faced with essentially the same situation as
in Hoffman, the court, slightly more than two
months later, ruled for the plaintiff. 78 There, Ab-

ercrombie & Fitch, an upscale retailer of casual
apparel for men and women and publisher of a
quarterly subscription catalog consisting of approximately 75% advertising of its wares and 25%
stories, news and other editorial content, printed
a photograph of a number of competitors at the
1965 Makaha International Surf Championship in
Hawaii as part of a section of its quarterly, entitled
"Surf Nekkid." ' 7 - The section included an article

recounting the history of surfing and another entitled "Your Beach Should Be This Cool," describing the history of Old Man's Beach at San Onfre,
California.8° The following page included the
photograph of the plaintiffs wearing distinctive Tshirts. Following the pictures were two pages advertising specially manufactured T-shirts like
those worn by the surfers. The surfing section
contained other articles as well. 8 '
The photograph had been purchased from the
photographer by Abercrombie employees specially for the quarterly "essentially as window82
dressing to advance the catalog's surf-theme."
Permission to use their images was not obtained
from the competitors and they brought suit claiming, among other things, misappropriation of
their names and likenesses for commercial purposes under California common law.""
The United States District Court for the Central
and artistic expression regarding such celebrities who
play important roles in the American cultural landscape.
Hoffman is a refreshing example of a court striking the
right balance.
Id. at 18. It should be kept in mind that Communication
Lawyer is essentially a publication for media defense lawyers.
77 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001).
78
Id. at 999.
79
Id. at 1000.
80
81

Id.
/(d.

82

/d. at 1002 (the Ninth Circuit's characterization).

83

Id. at 1003.

20031

The Ninth Circuit's Invasion of the Tort of Invasion of Privacy

District of California granted summary judgment
to the defendant retailer, concluding that the use
of the plaintiff surfers' names and likenesses constituted expression protected under the First
Amendment.8 4 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, hold-

ing that while "no cause of action will lie for the
'8 5
publication of matters in the public interest,"
publication here significantly contributed to a
matter of the public interest as the defendants
claimed.
In the current action, there is a tenuous relationship
between Appellants' photograph and the theme
presented. Abercrombie used Appellants' photograph
essentially as window-dressing to advance the catalog's
surf-theme. The catalog did not explain that Appellants were legends of the sport and did not in any way
connect Appellants with the story preceding it.8 6

The appeals court did refer to its recent Hoffman decision in a footnote, 8 7 distinguishing it on
the basis that LAM was unconnected to, and received no consideration from the designers for
the gown illustrated in the article and the magazine merely referenced a shopping guide that provided stores and prices for the gown. The Ninth
Circuit panel's distinction of Hoffman is based on
the degree of commerciality involved but does not
come to grips with the issue of whether the false
image of the actor in a magazine "contribute[s]
significantly" (in the court's own words) to a matter of public interest. 88
What substantial contribution to a matter of
public interest can be found in a celebrity's image? This is the critical First Amendment question
in both cases. The degree of commerciality of the
publications in which the appropriated images of
the celebrities involved is at best relevant only as
to whether the commerciality has a substantial
First Amendment component. Some commercial
speech is of public importance such as the discussion in a pamphlet of the societal value of a company's condoms in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products

Corp.89 Other commercial speech is devoid of substantial public interest such as the price of toothpaste in a newspaper ad. The integration of the
appropriated celebrity's name and image in a
84

Id. at 1002-03.

85

Id. at 1001 (quoting Montana v.San Jose Mercury

News, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 790, 793 (1995)).
86 Id. at 1002.

9(

Id. at 1002, n.2.
Id. at 1002.
463 U.S. 60 (1983).
Downing, 265 F.3d at 1002.

91

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

87
88
89

OF TORTS

magazine article having a commercial purpose to
promote merchandise featured in the article is no
different from the unauthorized use of a celebrity's name and image in a catalog as "windowdressing." 9°1 The question for First Amendment
protection is always whether the unauthorized use
of another's name or image substantially contributes to a matter of public interest, and like the
photograph of surfers in a catalog, the doctored
image of Dustin Hoffman in women's clothing for
a fashion spread in a magazine does not. Despite
the effort to distinguish the two cases, the Downing panel got it right and the Hoffman panel got it
wrong.
III.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE TORT
OF INTRUSION

While less potential damage is likely to be done
by the Ninth Circuit regarding the tort of intrusion, it has sown confusion with two recent opinions regarding this relatively simple branch of invasion of privacy.
This tort is defined by the Restatement Second
in the following manner: "One who intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs
or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person."' As is
clear from the Restatement definition, this privacy
tort - unlike the right of publicity - does not di-

rectly involve publication of any material concerning complaining parties. It does, however, impact
the news and information gathering process
which is the lifeblood of the news media, particularly investigative reporting.
One key to determining if the particular news
and information gathering amounts to actionable
intrusion is whether the target of the information
gathering has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy given the place of the alleged intrusion. 92 Thus, one's home,93 office, 9 4 hospital or
92
See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d
469, 490 (1998); Tobin v. Michigan Civil Serv. Comm'n, 331

N.W.2d 184, 189 (1982); People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals v. Bobby Ber6sini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1279-81

(1995);

§652B (1977).

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS.

§652B, cmt. c

(1977).
9-1 See, e.g., Miller v. National Broad. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d
1463, 1483-85 (1986) (private aparftment).
94 See generally Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245
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hotel room, -5 all of which can be secured to keep
society out, are such places. On the other hand,
when one is in public or can be easily observed
from a public place, the courts hold that the party
observed has no reasonable expectation of privacy
and there is no actionable intrusion.'
A.

Deteresa v. American BroadcastingCompanies,
Inc.

The Ninth Circuit confronted this aspect of invasion of privacy in Deteresa v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc.9 7 and got it right, but not for long.

Pursuing the O.J. Simpson murder prosecution
story, a producer for American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc. ("ABC") came to the door of
Beverly Deteresa's condominium in Irvine, California. Ms. Deteresa was one of the flight attendants on the flight Mr. Simpson took to Chicago
shortly after Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald
Goldman were murdered at Ms. Simpson's Los
Angeles home. When she opened the door, the
producer told Ms. Deteresa that he worked for
ABC and wanted to speak with her about appearing on his network to discuss the flight. Ms. Deteresa asked for identification and the newsman produced an ABC photo identification card. Ms.
Deteresa initially said she was not interested in appearing on the producer's show but added that
she was "frustrated" to hear news reports about
the flight that she knew were false. She informed
the producer that Simpson had not kept his hand
in a bag during the flight. She also informed him
as to the exact seat Simpson occupied in the first
class section. The producer called Ms. Deteresa
the next day asking her again to appear on television. When she declined, he told her that he had
audio-taped their entire conversation the previous
day. He also had an ABC cameraperson videotape
them as they talked at the doorway. Ms. Deteresa
hung up on the producer and told her husband
(9th Cir. 1971) (office).
95
See, e.g., Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W. 2d 291 (1942)
(hospital room); Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792
(Me. 1976) (hospital room); see aLto Shulman v. Group W
Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 491 (1998) (rescue helicopter-).
96 See, e.g., Shulman, 955 P.2d at 490 (automobile accident scene); Ross v. Burns, 612 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1980) (narcotics agent photographed in public near a courthouse by
newspaper reporters); cf.Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc.
375 So.2d 1386 (La. 1979) (owner's "weather worn and un-

kempt" home photographed from public street); RESTAl.-
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what had transpired. He called the producer and
told him that his wife did not want ABC to air the
videotape. The producer replied that ABC did not
need the wife's consent to broadcast the videotape. Ms. Deteresa's husband also asked that ABC
not broadcast their address, Ms. Deteresa's name
or the attdiotape.
That evening ABC broadcast a five-second clip
of the videotape on a program called "Day One."
Simultaneous with this clip, a network announcer
stated that "the flight attendant who served Simpson in the first class section told 'Day One' that
she did not, as widely reported, see him wrap his
hand in a bag of ice." ' ABC did not broadcast the
audiotape that the show's producer had surreptitiously made.
Ms. Deteresa filed an action in the United
States District Court for the Central District of
California claiming, inter alia, that ABC had engaged in physical intrusion on her solitude or into
her private affairs.9 ' The trial court entered summary judgment for ABC on all claims and Ms.
Deteresa appealed. A panel of the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the summary judgment.
On the common law claim of intrusion, the
panel held that under the facts of the case, Ms.
Deteresa had no reasonable expectation of privacy or, at most, the defendants' conduct had only
an insubstantial impact on her privacy interests
and therefore, as a matter of law, neither the
videotaping or the audiotaping tortuously invaded her privacy.'°" While the appeals court discussed the reasonable expectation of privacy issue
in relation to the California Eavesdropping Statute,1'11 that discussion is equally relevant to the
common law tort claim of intrusion. The panel
pointed to the facts that the producer revealed
that he worked for ABC and wanted Ms. Deteresa
to appear on television to discuss the flight; Ms.
Deteresa did not tell the producer that her statements concerning the flight were in confidence;
OF TORTS §652D, cmt. b (1977).
121 F.3d 460, 465-66 (9th Cir. 1997).
id. at 463.

MENT (SECOND)
97
98

ld.
I.

Iold. at 465-66 (quoting Sanders v. American Broad.
Cos., Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595, 598 (1997) ("If the undisputed material facts show no reasonable expectation of privacy or an insubstantial impact on privacy interests, the question of invasion may be adjudicated as a matter of law."), reversed and remanded to978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999)).
""
CAL. PEN. CODE §632 (West 1999).
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she did not tell him that the conversation was just
between them; she did not request that the producer not share the information with anyone else;
and the producer did not promise Ms. Deteresa
that he would keep what she told him in confidence. From these undisputed facts, the panel
concluded "that no one in Deteresa's shoes could
reasonably expect that a reporter would not divulge her account of where Simpson had sat on
the flight and where he had or had not kept his
10 2

hand."

On the issue of whether any intrusion that
might have occurred would be actionable, the
panel first addressed the videotape. Ms. Deteresa
did not dispute that she was videotaped in public
view by a cameraperson situated in a public place
and that ABC broadcast only a five-second clip
which did not include either her name or her address. Under these circumstances any intrusion
from the videotaping was de minimis and no tort
03
action would lie. 1

As for the audiotaping, the panel found that intrusion was not objectively offensive. Ms. Deteresa
spoke voluntarily and freely to a person who had
identified himself as a newsperson. He did not
enter her home to make the audiotape, which was
never broadcast and no intimate details of anyone's life were recorded. Under these circumstances, the panel held that the intrusion was not
sufficiently offensive to state a common law intru4
sion privacy claim. 11,

These rulings are consistent with settled law
and common sense. Any sentient person must
know that when one chooses to talk to a news
gatherer without clear restriction, what that person says may well be published. It is the nature of
news gatherers to disclose what they glean. One
simply can have no expectation of privacy when
making unrestricted disclosures such as those
made by Ms. Deteresa. As for the requirement of
offensiveness of the intrusion, the complaining
party needs to show some nastiness on the part of
the defendant and not her own mere hurt feelings. For example, it was considered offensive for
a magazine photographer to enter the hospital
room of a patient with an exotic disease and take
Deteresa, 121 F.3d 460 at 465.
Id. at 466. Compare Aisenson v. ABC, 220 Cal. App. 3d
146, 269 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1990) (relied on by the panel in
Deteresa).
102

103

104

Id. at 465-66.

105

See Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W. 2d

her photograph without permission and against
her will.1

5

Thus, the Ninth Circuit got this intru-

sive invasion of privacy case right but unfortunately it did not quit while it was ahead.
B.

Alpha Therapeutic Corporationv. Nippon Hoso
Kyokai

In Alpha Therapeutic Corp. v. Nippon Hoso Kyokai 0 6 another broadcasting company, this time
Japanese, was also alleged, among other things, to
have intruded on the privacy of Alpha Therapeutic ("Alpha"), a producer of blood plasma derivatives. A four-minute news story produced by Nippon Hoso Kyokai ("NHK") promoting two subsequent hour-long programs about Alpha was aired
twice in the United States on a Japanese language
channel. NHK had developed the programs and
the news story from 15,000 pages of confidential,
internal documents belonging to Alpha. Alpha
had disclosed these documents pursuant to a protective order solely in connection with unrelated
litigation pending in a United States federal district court. NHK received bootleg copies of these
documents from an unnamed source. NHK employees then followed up by interviewing a number of Americans including the plaintiff, Clyde
McAuley. The reporter interviewing McAuley
went to his home unexpectedly and when he answered the door, began asking him questions. McAuley had not agreed to be interviewed in advance by NHK but apparently knew that the interviewer was a newsperson because he did not allege in his complaint that he was unaware that the
person talking to him was a reporter. The reporter wore a hidden microphone on his necktie,
and a camera operator and sound technician sat
in a van parked in the street in front of McAuley's
house. McAuley did not know that the interview
was being recorded and at no time during the interview did he consent to being recorded on audio or videotape.
This interview was included in NHK's "Hour
Long Program." McAuley and Alpha brought suit
in California state court claiming, inter alia, that
the interview constituted the tort of intrusion.
291 (1942); see also Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d
792 (Me. 1976) (physician entered hospital room to take
photograph of a dying man without permission).
106 199 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion withdrawn, 237
F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001).
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NHK removed the case to federal district court
where the trial judge dismissed the invasion of privacy count because it did not state a claim for re7

lief. 10

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit panel, without citing Deteresa, reversed, holding that even assuming
McAuley knew he was speaking with a reporter, he
could still state a claim for invasion of privacy because "a person may reasonably expect privacy
against the electronic recording of a communication, even though he or she had no reasonable
expectation as to confidentiality of the communication's contents.""' But the same could be said
for Ms. Deteresa. She was audio and videotaped
initially without her knowledge though she knew
she was talking to a television newsperson. What
makes the panel's Alpha Therapeutic ruling on intrusion even more bizarre is that one judge,
Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, was common to both
the Deteresa and Alpha Therapeutic panels.
What could have happened between Deteresa in
July of 1997 and Alpha Therapeuticin December of
1999 to make for such a surprising U-turn? The
only happening that might conceivably explain it
is the California Supreme Court's decision in
Sanders v. American Broad. Cos., Inc.'0 9 in June of
1999 and relied upon by the Ninth Circuit panel.
In Sanders, yet another case involving ABC, a reporter for the network, Stacy Lescht, obtained employnent as a "telepsychic" with Psychic Marketing Group ("PMG"), which also employed plaintiff Mark Sanders in that same capacity. Lescht's
apparent purpose in accepting this job while still
a reporter for ABC was to document any wrongdoing by the company. To that end Lescht wore a
small video camera hidden in her hat and secretly
videotaped her conversations with several coworkers, including Sanders.
When Sanders found out about the videotaping, he sued Lescht and ABC for, among other
causes of action, the tort of intrusion. Sanders obtained a judgment on the intrusion claim but it
was reversed by the District Court of Appeals. The
appellate court's ruling was based on the ground
Id. at 1083.
Id. (quoting Sanders, 978 P.2d at 72).

[Vol. 11

that the jury's verdict for the defendants on another cause of action, the California Eavesdropping Statute,'"' established that Sanders could
have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
his workplace conversations because they could
be overheard by others in the common office
space. III

The California Supreme Court granted review
to determine whether the fact that workplace interactions might be witnessed by others on the
premises necessarily defeats, for purposes of tort
law, a reasonable expectation of privacy the participants have against covert videotaping by ajournalist.' 2 The Supreme Court held that it did not
and reversed the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the SandersLescht conversations could only be overheard by
coworkers. There was no evidence that the public
was invited into the PMG Los Angeles office or
that the office was visited by the press or subject to
videotape surveillance by the mass media. Therefore, workers in the PMG workplace had a reasonable expectation that their conversations would
not be coveitly videotaped by members of the
press or others even when 'the workers knew their
coworkers might overhear them. Summing up,
the Court said, "[T]he fact that coworkers may
have observed a workplace interaction does not as
a matter of law eliminate all expectations of privacy the participants may reasonably have had
vis-d-vis covert videotaping by a stranger to the
workplace." ' 13
The Sanders court takes a fairly novel approach
to the issue of reasonable expectation of privacy
in intrusion cases.'' 4 The Ninth Circuit panel,
without critical analysis of whether the California
Supreme Court's approach was applicable to the
facts of Alpha Therapeutic, seized upon certain language in Sanders to aid it in reaching its doubtful
decision: "[A] person may reasonably expect privacy against the electronic recording of a communication even though he or she had no reasonable
expectation as to confidentiality of the communication's contents."' '5 The Ninth Circuit panel fur-

1o

Id.

469, 491-93 (1998). Though Sanders represents a novel approach to newsgathering intrusion, it is generally applauded
by one student commentator. See Nathan D. Leadstrom,

11(

CAL. PENAL CODE

112

§632 (West 1999).
Sanders, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595, 598 (1997).
Sanders, 978 P.2d at 69.

Sanders v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.; Does it Mean
the End to the Use of Hidden Cameras in Undercover Media Investigations?, 40 WASHBURN LJ. 143 (2000)

113

Id. at 78.

114

Compare Shuhnan v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d

115 Alpha Therapeutic Corp. v. Nippon Hoso Kyokai, 199
F.3d 1078,1089 (quoting Sanders, 978 P.2d at 72) (emphasis

107

108
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ther quotes the California Supreme Court as saying:
[Although] one who imparts private information risks
the betrayal of his confidence by the other party, a substantial distinction has been recognized between the
second hand repetition of the contents of a conversation and its simultaneous dissemination to an unannounced second auditor, whether
that auditor be a per1
son or a mechanical device. 16

Though the panel's choice of quotes captures
the essence of the California Supreme Court's
thinking, that thinking is not applicable to Alpha
Therapeutic. It is one thing to know that coworkers
may overhear you and have your words repeated
in limited conversation, but not know that someone from the mass media is recording those same
words for later mass distribution. It is quite another to know that you are talking to a representative of the mass media though you do not know
you are being recorded.
The Ninth Circuit fails to credit the intelligence
of the individuals interviewed here. Who does not
know that when a newsperson gets answers to
questions, he or she may publish them far and
wide regardless of whether they have been electronically recorded? The interviewer may even
possess a phonographic memory though no tape
recorder.
When one is knowingly interviewed by a journalist and voluntarily chooses to give out information, one can have no expectation of privacy as to
that information whether or not the journalist is
covertly recording the conversation.' 1 7 That is the
teaching of Deteresa and nothing in the facts of
Sanders requires a different result.
IV.
A.

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
The Damage

The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of common
law invasion of privacy has created vast confusion,
particularly regarding the right of publicity. Along
the West Coast where so many celebrities dwell,
the parameters of the tort are no longer clear.
When one goes beyond the classic appropriation
of another's name or image for an advertisement
or commercial, one cannot be sure whether a taking of celebrity is actionable or is protected by the
added).
116

Id.

117
See Leadstrom, supra note 114, at 155 ("When the
plaintiff voluntarily gives statements to a reporter, he should

First Amendment. The White case implies that if
one simply brings to mind a particular celebrity in
a commercial setting without using that celebrity's
name or image or associative value, an actionable
invasion of privacy occurs and the First Amendment's protection of satire and parody does not
apply. But is this truncation of the First Amendment acceptable in constitutional jurisprudence?
Because White pushes the envelope to such an extreme, can anyone tell if it really protects celebrity
interests or is-as so many commentators have
suggested-a bad call that needs correction?" 8
Certainly as it stands it cannot help but chill commercial speech that makes indirect reference to
celebrities without their leave or the leave of their
estates. But no one knows just how indirect an ad
writer has to be before the Ninth Circuit's version
of the First Amendment will protect his or her
creative expression relative to celebrity.
And even the Ninth Circuit appears to be conflicted by White, for it has over-compensated for
the over-protection of celebrity there by cutting
back on protection of celebrity image elsewhere
as in Hoffman. In the process, the appeals court
has created uncertainty about the parameters of
commercial speech. Before Hoffman no one had
expressed the belief that commercial speech was
limited to the direct proposal of a commercial
transaction. But that is exactly what the Ninth Circuit panel held in order to allow some slick magazine editors to utilize, without permission, Dustin
Hoffman's image to enhance their magazine's image as a "revved up" advertising medium.
As a result of the Hoffman decision Hollywood
celebrities are stripped of control of their own
names and images when someone wishes to make
use of them and does so with a veneer of "editorial content." There is uncertainty here, too, for
both celebrities and media types because they can
never know at the time of the appropriation how
thin the veneer must be before the First Amendment ceases to protect the appropriation.
The damage wrought by Hoffman may extend
far beyond Hollywood and the West Coast. Other
courts may be persuaded to follow the White and
Hoffman precedents, feeling that the Ninth Circuit

not complain when those statements are recorded for later
use because the plaintiff knows that part of a reporter's duty
is to relay the information given.").
118
See White, 971 F.2d at 1398.
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deals with celebrity issues all the time and its
judges must know what they are doing.
The appeals court decisions in the area of intrusion may be somewhat less damaging to the common law of tort. First, no one is likely to think that
its judges have special expertise in this area. Second, the opinion in Alpha Therapeutic was withdrawn, albeit more than a year after it was filed.'
Nevertheless, no one can be sure at this point
what "a reasonable expectation of privacy" means
in the Ninth Circuit, at least regarding those interviewed by identified news gatherers covertly recording the interviews. Of course, this confusion
and the likely chill on investigative reporting accompanying the confusion assumes that news
gatherers and their lawyers are aware of both
Deteresa and Alpha Therapeutic. But they will not
find out about Alpha Therapeutic by sheppardizing
Deteresa since that case was never distinguished or
even cited in Alpha Therapeutic. And while Alpha
Therapeutic can be discovered by sheppardizing
Sanders, Sanders did not discuss or even cite Deteresa. Clearly, there is a disconnect regarding the
three cases that may cause problems for counsel
down the road.

B.

Mitigation of the Damage

Many law review articles are published with an
eye to solving a troubling substantive or procedural legal problem. But, when the problem is the
inadequacy ofjudges to deal correctly and consistently with an important area of the law and the
judges are lifetime appointees, there is not much
that can be suggested to mitigate the damage being done other than to warn counsel of the danger, here of pursuing common law claims of inva1'
237 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001). The author made an
e-mail inquiry to Douglas E. Murell, Esquire, one of the
counsel for NHK, as to the reason for the Ninth Circuit's order of January 12, 2001 withdrawing the opinion. His e-mail
response of January 7, 2002 said, "The Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion at the request of all counsel as part of a
global resolution of the entire matter." This strongly suggests that the court did not withdraw its opinion because it
thought the ruling on the claim of intrusion to be wrong or
inconsistent with its earlier decision in Deteresa.
12)
See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)
(unreasonable publication of private facts); Time, Inc. v. Hill,
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sion of privacy in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Efforts should be
made at the outset of litigation, if it is in the client's interest, to file such claims in state court
and, if possible, to structure the case within ethical bounds so as to increase the likelihood that it
will not be removed to federal district court.
Will the United States Supreme Court step in to
mitigate the damage? Don't count on it. In modern times, the Court has not shown much interest
in dealing with the common law tort of privacy,
even when they implicate important First Amendment interests. There have been a few exceptions,' 2 0 and even one right of publicity case has
been heard,'12

but the grants of certiorari have

been few and far between.
It may be that persistent analytical criticism of
the court's handling of invasion of privacy cases in
scholarly law journals may make a difference.
However, the hullabaloo over the decision in
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. does not
appear to have had much effect. Perhaps all we
can do is hope for future appointments to the
court of lawyers or law professors better versed in
tort law.
V.

CONCLUSION

In a perfect world the Ninth Circuit would not
be allowed to decide common law invasion of privacy cases. But until such time as we achieve world
perfection, that court should decide these cases
en banc, thus reducing the danger of erroneous
or conflicting decisions by three-judge panels.
Moreover, counsel should think twice about pressing such cases in this court.

385 U.S. 374 (1967) (false light); Cantrell v. Forest City Pub.
Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (false light).
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Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433
U.S. 562 (1977). In Zacchini, a local television station's reporter, over Zacchini's objection, filmed and broadcast his
entire "human cannonball" act claiming it was a legitimate
news story protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme
Court held that the First Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendments do not permit a news organization to invade a
performer's right of publicity by exhibiting his entire act or
performance, thereby taking some or all of the attached economic value in the guise of reporting the news.

